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IN THE COURT OP APPEALS 
OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BLAINE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE) , 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 92-0734-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, Pamela Bradshaw ("Ms. Bradshaw"), 
by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal 
Clinic, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
submits the following REPLY BRIEF in support of her appeal: 
INTRODUCTION 
Several factors prompted Ms. Bradshaw to seek modifi-
cation of the parties' 1986 divorce decree in April, 1991. 
The original decree did not provide for the escalation of 
support for the parties' child Allison once Appellee's ("Mr, 
Blaine's") income substantially exceeded one thousand two 
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00+) per month. Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 5, Exhibit "B" 
attached to Appellants Brief ("Amended Findings"). How-
ever, in April, 1991, Mr. Blaine was earning two thousand 
eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) per month, more 
than twice the maximum monthly income anticipated in the 
original decree.1 Amended Findings, 5 9; Complaint, 5 2, 
Exhibit "A" attached to Appellants Brief ("Complaint"). 
Also in April, 1991, Allison was eight years old and the 
cost of caring for her had increased as she matured. 
Amended Findings, 5 4; Complaint, 5 2. The effects of 
inflation had also made caring for Allison more expensive. 
Amended Findings, 1 4 ; Complaint, 5 2. 
On the basis of these factors and in order to further 
Allison's best interests, Ms. Bradshaw petitioned the trial 
court to modify the parties7 1986 divorce decree. Although 
the trial court granted certain portions of Ms. Bradshaw's 
petition, the court refused to modify the original decree in 
the following important ways: (1) the trial court declined 
to order Mr. Blaine to increase his contribution to 
Allison's care retroactive to April, 1991, the date he was 
served with the Petition for Modification ("petition"); and, 
(2) the trial court failed to modify the existing decree to 
allow Ms. Bradshaw, as the custodial parent, to again claim 
Allison as her dependent for the purposes of income taxes. 
Because these rulings were based on legal error, and were 
1
 As of October 15, 1991, Mr. Blaine's monthly salary 
was three thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00) per month. 
2 
made without sufficient factual findings or legal reasoning, 
Ms. Bradshaw now appeals the trial court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Issues 
Mr. Blaine's statement of the issues in this case is 
misleading. For example, Mr. Blaine characterizes one of 
the issues before this court as whether the trial court 
erred when it refused to order that Mr. Blaine's increased 
child support obligation be retroactive to before October, 
1991, even though, allegedly before that date "there was no 
substantial change in circumstances as defined by the 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act." Appellee's Brief 
at 1. However, Mr. Blaine never cites or quotes a statutory 
definition of "substantial change" and relies on his 
mistaken reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) 1953 as 
amended), to suggest a vague definition of "substantial 
change." Mr. Blaine ignores two crucial problems with his 
assertion. First, § 78-45-7.2 (6) applies only to the 
impact that the enactment of or change in the guidelines may 
have on child support obligations. Because the provision is 
strictly limited in scope, it cannot provide a workable 
definition of "substantial change" for the broad purposes of 
the Act. Second, § 78-45-7.2 (6) provides that a 25% or 
more increase from an existing child support order and a new 
obligation under Utah's child support guidelines is a 
3 
sufficient — not a necessary — basis for a modification of 
the obligation. Because § 78-45-7.2 (6) provides only one 
possible definition of a "substantial change" for the 
purpose of the Act, that "definition" is of little value to 
a general understanding of the term. 
Mr. Blaine also misrepresents the second issue before 
this Court. He characterizes this issue as whether the 
trial court erred when it refused to transfer the tax 
dependency exemption to Ms. Bradshaw even though "based on 
the stipulated facts, there was no change in the circum-
stances upon which the Decree of Divorce was based." 
Appellee's Brief at 1. Contrary to Mr. Blaine's contention, 
the stipulated facts in this case confirm that substantial 
changes in the parties' circumstances did occur after the 
1986 decree. These new circumstances — an increase in Mr. 
Blaine's 1991 income to 2.5 times above the maximum income 
anticipated by the original decree, (Findings of Fact, \ 2), 
and the increase in the cost of caring for Allison, (Find-
ings of Fact, 5 4) — required that the tax exemption be 
transferred to Ms. Bradshaw. Although these are the changed 
circumstances which prompted the trial court to increase Mr. 
Blaine's support obligation to Allison, they also establish 
the proper basis for a transfer of the award of the tax de-
pendency exemption. 
4 
II. Standard of Review 
Because the trial court's ruling was based on stip-
ulated facts, there are no disputed facts in this case. 
Accordingly, this Court should review the decision below for 
correctness and should afford no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 
(Utah App. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
Despite the soundness of this authority, Mr. Blaine 
contends that the proper standard of review in this case is 
"whether the lower court abused its discretion or committed 
manifest injustice." Appellee's Brief at 1. While this 
standard of review may be appropriate when the trial court 
has broad discretion to make factual findings and apply them 
within the "confines of legal precedence," Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah App. 1992); see also, 
Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988); Hansen v. 
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987), it is not 
appropriate when the legal conclusions made by the lower 
court are at issue. Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 945 
("we review the proffered facts and draw our own legal 
conclusions therefrom"). Because an appeals court is in as 
good as position to review stipulated facts as is the court 
below, this Court should not defer to trial court's 
conclusions. Id.; Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d at 816; 
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d at 409. 
5 
In addition, Ms. Bradshaw challenges the adequacy and 
appropriateness of the findings by the trial court. When 
the suitability and sufficiency of the findings below is at 
issue, this court has determined that the failure to make 
proper findings can be itself an abuse of discretion. Hill 
v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992); Motes v. Motes, 786 
P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 
909, 911-12 (Utah App. 1988). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court made several errors when it declined 
to modify portions of the original divorce decree as 
requested by Ms. Bradshaw. First, the trial court relied on 
an improper interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) 
(1953 as amended) (hereafter "§ 78-45-7.2 (6)"), when it 
refused to order that Mr. Blaine's increased child support 
obligation be retroactive to the date of service of the 
petition. Although § 78-45-7.2 (6) applies only to 
modification orders based on the enactment of or changes in 
the Child Support Guidelines (the "guidelines"), the trial 
court applied it to Ms. Bradshaw's petition which recites 
Mr. Blaine's increased income and the rising cost of 
Allison's care as the grounds for modification. 
Second, the trial court improperly denied Ms. 
Bradshaw's request that she, as the custodial parent, be 
allowed to again claim Allison as her dependent for income 
6 
tax purposes. Despite the presumption embodied in the Child 
Support Guidelines, Federal tax code, and Utah case law that 
the custodial parent should be awarded the dependency 
exemption, the trial court refused to transfer the exemption 
to Ms. Bradshaw. In addition, the trial court offered no 
findings to substantiate its conclusion to deviate from the 
guidelines or established precedent. This failure alone 
constitutes reversible error. 
Although Mr. Blaine offers several arguments to justify 
the trial court's rulings, his contentions are fruitless. 
Mr. Blaine attempts to defend the trial court's decision to 
limit the retroactivity of his increased support obligation 
to Allison. Without the benefit of statutory authority or 
judicial precedent, Mr. Blaine insists that § 78-45-7.2 (6) 
creates a rebuttable presumption that a 25% increase in 
child support from the existing order to the amount 
established under the guidelines is mandatory to establish a 
substantial change in circumstances. 
However, Mr. Blaine fails to note that § 78-45-7.2 (6) 
is limited in application and deals only child support 
orders affected by the "enactment of the guidelines and any 
subsequent change in the guidelines . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended). Because Ms. Bradshaw's 
petition does not rely on the enactment of or a change in 
the guidelines to establish a substantial change in circum-
stances, the provision is not relevant to her petition for 
7 
modification. Even if § 78-45-7.2 (6) were relevant it 
would not support Mr. Blaine's contention — the provision 
merely establishes a sufficient condition for substantial 
change of circumstances, not a necessary or presumptively 
rebuttable one. 
Mr. Blaine also tries to defend the trial court's 
refusal to transfer the tax dependency exemption to Ms. 
Bradshaw as the custodian of Allison. Mr. Blaine insists 
that the stipulated facts indicate that there has not been a 
substantial change in circumstances which warrants 
reconsideration of the award of the tax dependency exemption 
provided in the original decree. However, Mr. Blaine 
ignores that two significant factors — the substantial 
increase in his salary and the increase in the cost of 
caring for Allison — are relevant to the award of the 
exemption. Mr. Blaine also forgets that Utah's Child 
Support Guidelines, the Federal tax code, 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) 
(1988), and judicial precedent all assume that the custodial 
parent should be awarded the tax dependency exemption. In 
light of this authority, the trial court is obligated to 
abide by the guidelines, or in the alternative, to provide 
sufficient and adequate findings to explain its departure 
from the statutorily mandated factors and Utah case law. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court Order Increasing Mr. Blaine's Support 
Obligation to Allison Should be Made Retroactive to April, 
1991, the Date of Service of the Petition to Modify. 
Although the trial court based its ruling concerning 
the retroactive effect of the increase Mr. Blaine's child 
support obligation on a misreading of § 78-45-7.2 (6), Mr. 
Blaine vainly attempts to defend the court's reasoning. To 
this end, Mr. Blaine insists that § 78-45-7.2 (6) creates a 
rebuttable presumption that a 25% difference between an 
existing child support order and a support obligation under 
the guidelines is necessary to establish a substantial 
change in circumstances for the purposes of modifying a 
support order. For example, Appellee's Brief at 10, 18 and 
19. For several reasons, this interpretation of § 78-45-7.2 
(6) is incorrect. 
Most importantly, § 78-45-7.2 (6) applies only to the 
impact of the "enactment of the guidelines and any 
subsequent change in the guidelines11 on child support 
obligations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as 
amended) (emphasis added).2 This limitation on the scope of 
2
 The relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 
(6) (1953 as amended), states: 
With regard to child support orders, enactment of 
the guidelines and any subsequent change in the 
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for modifi-
cation of a court order, if there is a difference 
of at least 25% between the existing order and the 
guidelines . . . . 
9 
§ 78-45-7.2 (6) makes the provision irrelevant to Ms. 
Bradshaw's petition for modification. Mr. Blaine fails to 
acknowledge that Ms. Bradshaw's petition is not based on the 
enactment of or a change in the guidelines. Instead, Ms. 
Bradshaw claims that a substantial change in circumstances -
- independent of the impact of the guidelines — requires 
the modification of the parties' original decree. Ms. 
Bradshaw justifies her petition with two important 
stipulated facts — (1) that in April, 1991, Mr. Blaine's 
income was more than twice the maximum anticipated by the 
divorce decree; and (2) that, since the decree, the cost of 
caring for Allison had increased significantly. These 
stipulated facts are not dependent on or related to the 
impact of the guidelines on Mr. Blaine's support obligation 
to Allison. Thus, § 78-45-7.2 (6) is not relevant to a 
determination of retroactivity or a finding of substantial 
change in circumstances in this case. 
Furthermore, § 78-45-7.2 (6) in particular, and the 
guidelines in general, are not very helpful in resolving the 
issue of retroactivity. Rather, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 
(2) (1953 as amended),3 clearly gives the trial court 
3
 Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as 
amended) reads: 
A child or spousal support payment under a child 
support order may be modified with respect to any 
period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that 
petition was given to the . . . obligor . . . . 
10 
discretion to determine the proper date of retroactivity. 
Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d at 820 ("[§ 30-3-10.6 (2)] 
grants to the trial court full discretion to decide when an 
increased award should be made effective").4 Because the 
Child Support Guidelines are not intended to limit or 
otherwise direct the discretion of the trial court as to the 
retroactive effect of support obligations, any presumptions 
created by the guidelines are also irrelevant to retro-
activity. 
In any case, § 78-45-7.2 (6) does not create a 
rebuttable presumption concerning the definition of sub-
stantial change in circumstances. Although Mr. Blaine 
asserts that a presumption is created, he fails to cite any 
authority to support this contention. Instead, he relies on 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) (1953 as amended) ("the 
Child Support Guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable 
presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of . . . 
child support)," to sustain his claim. However, § 78-45-7.2 
(2) (a) is not relevant to § 78-45-7.2 (6) or to the issue 
of retroactivity and any rebuttable presumption created by 
the provision is inapplicable to the trial court's ruling in 
this case. 
4
 Although the trial court herein has broad discretion 
to decide the retroactive effect of Mr. Blaine's increased 
child support obligation, it cannot base its decision on an 
improper reading of the law or make its decision without 
providing the parties with adequate explanation or support. 
Because the district court committed both these errors, its 
ruling is invalid. 
11 
As confirmed above, § 78-45-7,2 (6) is not part of the 
guidelines. Instead, § 78-45-7.2 (6) is a part of the 
procedure to implement the guidelines and is meant only to 
determine when the enactment of or changes in the guidelines 
alone create a substantial change in circumstances 
sufficient to require modification of a support obligation. 
Accordingly, § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) does not encompass § 78-45-
7.2 (6) as part of the guidelines and makes no presumption 
concerning the 25% increase provision.5 
Mr. Blaine overlooks another crucicil detail of § 78-45-
7.2 (6). He fails to recognize that § 78-45-7.2 (6) 
specifies that a 25% increase in support obligation is a 
sufficient, rather than a necessary condition for the 
finding of a substantial change in circumstances. Thus, the 
only possible rebuttable presumption created by §§ 78-45-7.2 
(2) (a) & (6) would be that a 25% difference between an 
existing support order and an obligation established by the 
guidelines serves "as a ground" — not the only ground — 
for a modification of the existing order. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added). Because 
Ms. Bradshaw is relying on other grounds, independent of § 
78-45-7.2 (6), to justify her petition for modification, 
this presumption would not apply to or affect her claim. 
5
 Appropriately, in her petition asking for retro-
activity to April, 1991, Ms. Bradshaw need not and does not 
seek a variance from the guidelines. 
12 
Finally, Mr. Blaine disputes Ms. Bradshaw,s contention 
that the trial court erred by failing to provide adequate 
findings to support its conclusion that his increased 
support obligation to Allison was retroactive to only 
October, 1991. He challenges Ms. Bradshaw's claim even 
though the trial court relied solely upon an incorrect 
reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6) and offered no further findings 
to support its conclusion. However, Mr. Blaine fails to 
note that the trial court did not fulfill its obligation to 
sufficiently explain and support its rulings. Without 
findings by the trial court, the parties are in no position 
to assess or challenge the court,s decision. Crockett v. 
Crockett, 836 P.2d at 820-821; Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 
836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). In addition, without factual 
findings and documented reasoning by the trial court, an 
appellate court is unable to review the proceedings below. 
Id.; see also, Allred v Allred, 835 P.2d 974 (Utah App. 
1992) (trial court must specify in its findings the reasons 
a tax exemption is not given to the custodial parent); 
Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah App. 1990) (trial 
court must enter findings of fact on factors which 
constitute material issues); Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 
(Utah App. 1989); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah 
App. 1988). Given the requirements established in these 
cases, the trial court failed to make sufficient and 
adequate findings to support its decision. The trial court 
13 
relied on an incorrect interpretation of law and failed to 
address or consider other factors relevant to the 
retroactive effect of Mr. Blaine/s child support obligation. 
This failure constitutes an abuse of discretion and requires 
that this court vacate the ruling below. However, because 
the conclusions below were based on stipulated facts, this 
Court can properly determine that Mr. Blaine's increased 
support obligation to Allison should be retroactive to 
April, 1991 on the basis of the undisputed facts before it. 
The fact$ of this case require that the modification of 
the original child support order should be retroactive to 
April, 1991. The two factors, stipulated to by the parties 
as creating a substantial change in circumstances and as 
requiring a modification of the original decree, were both 
in existence in April, 1991. By April, 1991, Mr. Blaine's 
income was more than double the maximum anticipated by the 
original decree and the cost of caring for Allison had 
significantly increased. Accordingly, a substantial change 
in circumstances, sufficient to require a modification of 
the parties' existing child support obligations, had 
occurred by April, 1991. As a result, the increase in Mr. 
14 
Blaine's support obligation6 to Allison should be retro-
active to that date.7 
II. As the Custodial Parent, Ms. Bradshaw Should Be Awarded 
the Tax Dependency Exemption for Allison. 
Mr. Blaine vainly defends the trial court's refusal to 
transfer the tax dependency exemption for Allison to her 
custodial parent. Again, Mr. Blaine's arguments are 
unsuccessful. The trial court's ruling is inconsistent with 
the Child Support Guidelines,8 with the Federal tax code, 26 
6
 The exact increase should be based upon the parties' 
stipulated incomes as of April 22, 1991. 
7
 After acknowledging the stipulation and finding 
"that the cost of caring for [Allison as] a nine year old 
child is substantially greater than for caring for [her as] 
a three year old child," Amended Findings, 5 4, Mr. Blaine 
criticizes Ms. Bradshaw for not introducing more evidence to 
support the fact that it is now more expensive to care for 
Allison. Appellee's Brief at 21. This criticism is mis-
placed. Initially, Mr. Blaine forgets that the parties 
stipulated to the fact that care for Allison has become 
substantially more costly. Because of this stipulation, Ms. 
Bradshaw does not need to introduce evidence concerning the 
increased cost of caring for Allison. 
Second, Mr. Blaine forgets that one of the major goals 
of the child support guidelines was to eliminate the need 
for the introduction of receipts, itemizations and other 
proofs of expenses to support a child support obligation. 
The guidelines are presumed to be correct and to account for 
costs associated with rearing a child. Requiring Ms. 
Bradshaw to prove by further evidence that caring for 
Allison is more costly than it was in 1986, especially after 
the pertinent stipulation, would defeat the purpose of the 
Child Support Guidelines. 
8
 According to the Utah Child Support Task Force, 
Report On Proposed Child Support Guidelines, the guidelines 
presume that custodial parents claim their children as 
dependents for the purposes of income tax exemptions: "The 
basic child support figures are further adjusted reflecting 
the assumption that the custodial parent would receive the 
exemptions for all children. If the custodial parent 
15 
U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988), and judicial precedent, Motes v. 
Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989); Allred v Allred. 835 
P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1992), each of which direct that the 
custodial parent should be awarded the exemption. Despite 
these mandates, the trial court determined that a transfer 
of the exemption was not warranted. Further, although it 
departed significantly from the guidelines and from judicial 
precedent, the trial court did not justifying its decision. 
Mr. Blaine's contentions cannot hide the fact that the trial 
court's failure to explain or support its ruling is 
erroneous. 
Importantly, Mr. Blaine ignores that his new support 
obligation to Allison was based on the statutory Child 
Support Guidelines. These guidelines presume that the 
custodial parent is entitled to claim and does claim any 
children as dependents for the purposes of tax exemption.9 
relinquishes the exemption, this could be grounds for an 
adjustment in the basic award." Report On Proposed Child 
Support Guidelines at 6, 1 I, E (May 1988). 
9
 With an air of disbelief, Mr. Blaine states that 
"[t]he Appellant seems to be suggesting that the court's 
decision whether or not to modify the tax dependency 
exemption must be done in accordance with the Child Support 
Guidelines." Appellee's Brief at 24. Ms. Bradshaw is not 
just suggesting that compliance with the guidelines is 
necessary, she believes and understands that to be the law! 
The child support award herein was based upon the 
guidelines which assume the custodial parent claims the 
child as a dependent for income tax purposes. If the 
custodial parent were not assumed to be claiming the child 
as a dependant, the guidelines would require more support 
from the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent. See, 
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978 (the transfer of the tax 
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent llx should be 
16 
In order to depart from the rebuttable presumptions created 
by the guidelines, (Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) and 
(b) (1953 as amended)), the trial court must find that 
compliance with the guidelines would be "unjust, inappro-
priate or not in the best interest of a child in a par-
ticular case . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (3) (1953 as 
amended). Because the trial court made no findings at all 
to support its conclusion, it failed to comply with the 
statute and abused its discretion. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 
at 724. 
Mr. Blaine also failed to justify the trial court's 
departure from established case law concerning the award of 
the tax dependency exemption for Allison. Precedent in Utah 
sets forth factors to be considered by the trial court 
before it should order custodial parents to waive their tax 
exemptions: 
First, the noncustodial parent must have a higher 
income and provide the majority of support for the 
child. Second, the trial court must, from its 
findings, determine that by transferring the 
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent . 
. . [it is acting] in the best interests of the 
limited to those situations where the non-custodial parent 
has the higher income and provides the majority of support 
for the child or children whose exemption is claimed — 
support at a level which can be increased as a result of a 
reduction in his or her tax burden'") (quoting Motes v. 
Motes, 786 P.2d at 239, emphasis added). 
Therefore, it is only fair, if not mandated by statute, 
that the custodial parent, the obligee, be allowed to claim 
the dependency exemption. Yes, the award of "the tax 
dependency exemption must be done in accordance with the 
Child Support Guidelines." 
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child, which in all but exceptional circumstances 
would translate into an increased support level 
for the child. 
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978, Rather complying with 
Allred, the trial court failed to make any findings 
concerning Allison's best interests. Specifically, the 
trial court did not explain why Allison's best interests did 
not require an increased support obligation from Mr. Blaine 
to offset the detriment to Ms. Bradshaw from not having the 
tax exemption. Despite these failures, Mr. Blaine continues 
to insist that the trial court properly refused to transfer 
the dependency exemption. 
In addition, the trial court neglected to explain why 
the same substantial changes in circumstance that warranted 
an increase in Mr. Blaine's child support did not warrant a 
transfer of the tax dependency exemption to the custodial 
parent. While the trial court did determine that a "sub-
stantial change in circumstances of the parties . . . 
justifies modification of the [Mr. Blaine's] child support 
obligation," (Conclusions of Law, 5 3), it went on, without 
explanation, to find that ,f[t]here has not been a sub-
stantial change in circumstances of the parties sufficient 
to warrant altering the portion of the existing decree which 
awards to [Mr. Blaine] the right to clciim the minor child of 
the parties as a dependent" for tax purposes. Id., f 8. 
Although both the guidelines and Utah case law mandate 
that the same circumstances which would justify a 
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modification of Mr. Blaine's child support obligation would 
justify a transfer of the dependency exemption, Mr. Blaine 
argues that such a position is not defendable. To make this 
assertion, Mr. Blaine ignores that the circumstances upon 
which an award of child support are based are the exact same 
circumstances upon which the allocation of the dependency 
exemption are based. As established in Allred, the factors 
relevant to allocation of the dependency exemption include 
reference to "the particular economic realities" of the 
parties. Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978 (quoting, Motes 
v. Motes. 786 P.2d at 239). The court must consider the 
incomes of the parties and the best interests of the child 
before it orders the transfer of the dependency exemption to 
the noncustodial parent. Allred v. Allred. 835 P.2d at 978. 
Similarly, the guidelines incorporate these economic factors 
into a statutory determination of a parent's child support 
obligation. The guidelines consider the incomes of the 
parties as well as the best interests of the child to 
properly set the obligations of the parties. 
Mr. Blaine suggests that the only factor relevant to 
the award of the tax exemption to him was that he had a 
higher income and therefore has "more use" for the ex-
emption. Appellee's Brief at 24. This myopic character-
ization of the factors underlying the award of the depen-
dency exemption clearly ignores Allison's best interests. 
Further, this suggestion is contrary to Allred, which 
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considers the best interest of the child and the 
contribution of each parent to the care of the child in 
addition to the relative incomes of the parents. Allred v. 
Allred, 835 P.2d at 978. In that case, this Court 
specifically rejected the contention that the mere fact that 
one party has a greater income is an appropriate basis for 
the award of the dependency exemption to that party. Id. 
In addition, if greater income were the only factor upon 
which the award was made, the guidelines would not assume 
that the custodial parent is entitled to the tax exemption. 
Instead the guidelines would assume that the parent with the 
greater income would claim the exemption regardless of the 
best interests of the child. Because the guidelines make no 
such assumptions, Mr. Blaine/s argument fails. 
Finally, Mr. Blaine's argument that the guidelines do 
not apply to modifications of a pre-guideline decree also is 
unsuccessful. In 1986, when the parties' original divorce 
was granted, the statutory support guidelines were not in 
effect.10 However, when Ms. Bradshaw's petition for modifi-
cation was heard in September, 1992, the guidelines were 
applicable to her claim. Appropriately, the trial court's 
modification of Mr. Blaine's support obligation to Allison 
was determined under these guidelines. Contrary to Mr. 
Blaine's suggestion, however, the guidelines cannot be 
followed piecemeal. As part of the determination of Mr. 
10
 The Guidelines went into effect in April, 1989. 
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Blaine's support obligation, the guidelines assume that Ms, 
Bradshaw is entitled to the tax exemption. The guidelines 
direct that the allocation of the dependency exemption be 
based upon the parties' custodial versus noncustodial 
status, not upon the relative incomes of the parties, as Mr. 
Blaine suggests.11 Because the guidelines are applicable 
and were applied to Ms. Bradshaw's petition for 
modification, reason dictates that all of the assumptions 
they embody must be employed in the revision of the parties' 
original decree. 
For the reasons provided above, Mr. Blaine has failed 
to justify the trial court's decision not to return the tax 
dependency exemption for Allison to Ms. Bradshaw. Mr. 
Blaine's arguments do not explain away the trial court's 
failure to comply with the presumption embodied in Utah's 
Child Support Guidelines, the Federal tax code and Utah case 
law that the custodial parent is entitled to the exemption. 
11
 Mr. Blaine concedes that in setting support amounts, 
"Utah's Child Support Guidelines assume that the custodial 
parent is awarded the tax dependency exemption." Appellee's 
Brief at 26. Mr. Blaine then brushes aside this impediment 
to his position, and without citation to any authority says, 
that assumption only applies in the initial granting of a 
divorce and not in cases of modification such as this case. 
Id. 
Mr. Blaine further ignores that statutory assumption, 
by simply repeating his belief that there has been no 
substantial change in circumstances relative to the 
dependency exemption. For the sake of argument, if we 
assume that there has been a sufficient change in circum-
stances, as Ms. Bradshaw posits, and the guidelines are 
being used to set the amount of new child support to be 
paid, then it follows that the guidelines must be followed 
with regard to the allocation of the dependency exemption. 
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In addition, Mr. Blaine cannot justify the trial court/s 
failure to depart from the guidelines and judicial precedent 
without providing any findings to defend this departure. 
Furthermore, because the parties stipulated to the facts 
relevant to the award of the dependency exemption and this 
Court is in as good a position to consider these facts as 
was the trial court, this Court should draw its own legal 
conclusions from the facts. Accordingly, the Court should 
transfer the tax exemption for Allison to Ms. Bradshaw, the 
custodial parent. 
CONCLUSION 
As determined above, the trial court improperly based 
its conclusion concerning the retroactive effect of its 
child support order on a mistaken reading of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended). As a result, the trial 
court neglected to provide necessary factual and legal 
findings to support its decision. The trial court also 
improperly refused to return the tax exemption for Allison 
to her custodial parent without adequate findings to support 
its departure from the statutory guidelines and established 
case law. 
Furthermore, none of Mr. Blaine's arguments can justify 
the trial court's erroneous rulings. Specifically, Mr. 
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Blaine's contention that § 78-45-7.2 (6) creates a 
rebuttable presumption relevant to Ms. Bradshaw's petition 
for modification is unsuccessful. Ms. Bradshaw has not 
relied, and has no need to rely upon § 78-45-7.2 (6) to 
support her claim. Instead, she cites Mr. Blaine's 
increased income and the increased costs of caring for 
Allison as grounds for her petition. In addition, because § 
78-45-7.2 (6) is not part of the guidelines, but a procedure 
for implementing them, § 78-45-7.2 (6) is not the source of 
a presumption created by the guidelines. Finally, § 78-45-
7.2 (6) sets out only a sufficient condition for a sub-
stantial change in circumstances, not a necessary condition. 
As a result, the only presumption created by this section is 
that a 25% increase, due to the enactment or amendment of 
the guidelines, is sufficient cause for a modification of an 
existing child support obligation. 
Mr. Blaine's argument that the stipulated facts in this 
case do not warrant a transfer of the dependency exemption 
is also ill-founded. The same economic realities — the 
changing financial status of the parties and the increased 
costs of caring for Allison — which required a modification 
of the original child support order also require transfer of 
the tax exemption to the custodial parent. Both Utah case 
law and the Child Support Guidelines consider economic 
factors and the best interests of the child in addition to 
relative incomes of the parties to award the dependency 
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exemption. In addition, Mr. Blaine's suggestion that the 
guidelines are not applicable to an alteration of the award 
of the dependency exemption is invalid. Because the trial 
court's modification of Mr. Blaine's child support 
obligation was based upon the statutory guidelines, the 
allocation of the tax exemption must also conform to the 
guideline's assumptions. Alternatively, if justice demands 
a departure from the presumption that the custodial parent 
is entitled to the exemption, embodied in the guidelines and 
Utah case law, the trial court must provide sufficient 
findings to support its deviation from these presumptions. 
Because the trial court failed to follow the guidelines and 
Utah case law and failed to justify its decision to do so, 
the ruling below is erroneous. 
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the trial court's 
ruling concerning the retroactive effect of Mr. Blaine's 
increase child support obligation to Allison and the court's 
refusal to transfer the tax dependency exemption to Ms. 
Bradshaw. In light of the substantial change in 
circumstances which had occurred by April, 1991, this Court 
should conclude that considerations of Allison's best 
interests and the financial status of her parents require 
that the modification of Mr Blaine's support obligation be 
retroactive to the date upon which Mr. Blaine received 
notice of Ms. Bradshaw's petition in an amount based upon 
their April, 1991 incomes. This Court should also direct 
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the trial court to enter an order requiring that Allison's 
best interests will be served by awarding Ms. Bradshaw, as 
her custodian, the tax dependency exemption commencing in 
1992. 
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